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An Exploration of the Unintended Temporal
Extension of the Plant Patent Term
I. INTRODUCTION
The patent law framework is designed to encourage innovation
by way of reciprocity: the government furnishes a period of exclu-
sivity to the inventor in exchange for disclosure of the invention.1
The inventor is granted a period of exclusivity for a period of 20
years2 from the date of filing of the patent application in order to
recoup the costs for and capitalize on his or her invention.3 This
period is in exchange for the inventor's disclosure of how to create
or duplicate the invention. Accordingly, when the period is up, the
invention is then dedicated to the public and anyone may enjoy
the benefit of practicing it.' Patents are available for almost any-
thing:5 pharmaceuticals, the various parts in our cars, the cosmet-
ics and shampoos we use daily, and even for the various plants
you may see growing at your local nursery.
Over ten thousand plant patents have been issued in the United
States.6 Plants were first able to be patented in 1930, with the
passage of the Plant Patent Act,7 which protected plant breeders
from having their respective plants that they "created" from being
reproduced to the point where the breeder is unable to make a de-
cent living and few new breeders would be attracted to the field.'
The legislators of the day were concerned with the fact that once
the new plant variety "left the hands of the breeder, it may be re-
produced in unlimited quantity by all."9 The plant patents were to
1. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
2. The patent term was changed in 1995 from 17 years from the date that the patent
issued to 20 years from the date that the patent is filed. See Pub.L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(Dec. 1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (2003)). For the history about patent terms, see
5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.04[2], at 16-186 (2002 ed.)
3. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480-81.
4. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255-58 (1945).
5. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
6. The amount of plant patents issued can be obtained by generating a search at the
United States Patent Office website, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/search-
adv.htm (using search term "PN/pp" for the period of time 1790 to present) (last visited Oct.
17, 2003).
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2003) (original version at ch. 312, § 1, 46 Stat. 376 (1930)).




follow the same statutory scheme as regular utility patents; how-
ever, the enablement requirement was relaxed.'0 It therefore ap-
pears logical that the enablement requirement was relaxed be-
cause the plants were in the public domain when the patent would
expire. Upon the expiration date, the public would then be able to
freely reproduce the plants at will, thus relaxing the requirement
of enablement for the plant patent and thereby creating a loop
hole.
An example of the loophole is a breeder who bred a plant that
bears a seedless variety of fruit. The breeder then obtains a plant
patent and never distributes the plants to the public during the
patent term. However, the breeder does sell the seedless fruits,
and when the patent term expires the breeder still has total con-
trol over the plant. Therefore, the public does not have access to
the plant in order to replicate it. This goes against every policy
that the patent laws are based on. Once the patent expires, the
idea or the invention is supposed to enter the public domain. This
poses a rather interesting group of questions: How should the
problem presented by the prior example be remedied? Should this
be considered patent misuse? Should society allow the plant
breeder to continue his operation? Are antitrust issues implicated
if the breeder is allowed to continue operations without distribut-
ing the once patented plants? Should the government step in and,
with limited interruption to the breeder's operations, take a few
cuttings at the end of the patent term so that the plant is able to
enter the public domain? If the government does take some of the
breeder's plants, can it be construed as a taking under the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution? This article attempts to analyze
and answer these questions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Laws in General
The stated purpose of the United States Constitution in grant-
ing the power to Congress to create legislation in the area of intel-
lectual property, is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."" In order for individuals to become interested in and be
10. The enablement portion of a patent application is a written description of the in-
vention and instructs a "person skilled in the art" on how to recreate or practice the inven-
tion. 35 U.S.C. 112 (2003).
11. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480; See also U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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able to finance further interest in the progression of science, an
incentive is given to the inventor. Article I, section 8 of the Con-
stitution "authorizes Congress to secure for 'limited times' to in-
ventors 'the exclusive right' to their discoveries."12 Congress en-
abled this concept through Section 154 of Title 35, which states
that:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the in-
vention throughout the United States... [s]uch a grant shall
be for a term beginning on the date in which the patent issues
and ending 20 years from the date that the application was
filed in the United States...""
Therefore, the patent owner obtains an exclusive property right
while the patent is in force and those rights become public prop-
erty once the patent term expires."
There are three different kinds of patents that one can obtain
through the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Utility
Patents," Design Patents,"6 and Plant Patents." Utility Patents
are issued to inventors pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 and are the
patents that most people think of when they hear the word "pat-
ent." Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
12. Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964).
13. 35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1)-(2) (2003). Patent Law is contained in Title 35 of the United
States Code. Regulations concerning Patents are contained in Title 37 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations.
14. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31.
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-57 (2003). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the requirements of this title." 35
U.S.C. §101 (2003).
16. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (2003). "Whoever invents any new, original, and ornamental
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the require-
ments of this title. The provisions of this title relating to patents shall apply to patents for
designs, excepts as otherwise provided." 35 U.S.C. §171 (2003).
17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (2003).
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety
of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings,
other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the requirements and provision of this title. The
provisions of this title relating to patents shall apply to patents for plants, except as
otherwise provided.
35 U.S.C. §161 (2003).
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patent thereof, subject to the requirements of this title."18 The
terms of section 101 are very broad and are to be interpreted as
such. 9 "In choosing such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and
'composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Con-
gress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide scope."" Therefore, inanimate objects and living things, such
as man made micro-organisms and even sexually reproduced
plants, are patentable under section 101.1
One of the requirements that must be met when applying for a
utility patent is the specification requirement under 35 U.S.C.
§112, which requires the inventor to describe how to make the in-
vention in such terms as to enable another, who is skilled in the
art, to make or use the invention.22 Section 112 is the means by
which the inventor makes his disclosure so that when the patent
term expires, the public may freely reproduce the invention.23
B. Rights Conferred with the Issuance of a Patent
This section discusses the rights conferred with a patent. It is
important to understand the specific rights afforded a patent
holder in order to understand the rationale behind this author's
analysis. The key concept is that an inventor is able to exclude
others for a limited time and once the patent expires, the public is
free to practice the invention.
Patents are a form of property and grant the owner the ability
to exclude others from using the invention.24 Section 154 of Title
35 grants the "right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
19. J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001).
20. Id. at 130 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308).
21. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 130.
22. Id. at 131. 35 U.S.C. §112 reads, in pertinent part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear and concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The specification
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claim-
ing the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention....
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
23. A.K. Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
24. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). "Under the
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 261, a patent is a form of property right, and the right to exclude rec-
ognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property." Id.
Vol. 42140
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importing the invention into the United States" to the patentee.25
Patents do "not grant the affirmative right to make, use, or sell."
6
Patentees are not obligated to practice, sell, or make their inven-
tion once it is patented, 27 and therefore not using the invention
does not effect the validity of the patent.2 8 However, once a patent
has expired, it falls into the public domain and then anyone is free
to copy and practice the invention. 9
Some have compared patents to a granting of a temporary mo-
nopoly; however, in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., °
the Court said that equating patents to monopolies is not accu-
rate.3'
Though often so characterized a patent is not, accurately
speaking, a monopoly, for it is not created by the executive
authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the com-
munity except the grantee of the patent. The term 'monopoly'
connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for buying, sell-
ing, working, or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed
prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the
people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it en-
joyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the
community by adding to the sum of human knowledge. He
may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely.
In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit
to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoy-
ment is guaranteed him for seventeen years,32 but, upon the
expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention in-
ures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to
practice it and profit by its use. To this end the law requires
such disclosure to be made in the application for patent that
others skilled in the art may understand the invention and
how to put it to use.33
25. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2003) (emphasis added).
26. CHISUM, supra note 2, § 16.021] at 16-9.
27. Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90 (1902).
28. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-379 (1945).
29. Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989).
30. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
31. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 186.
32. Utility Patent terms are now 20 years from the date of filing of the application. 35
U.S.C. 154 (a)(2) (2003).
33. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 186-87 (citations omitted).
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To summarize, the right of exclusivity that comes with a patent is
in exchange for disclosure so that the public may enjoy the inven-
tion when the patent term is finished.
C. A Brief Introduction to Plant Reproduction
Plant reproduction can occur sexually or asexually.' The sexual
reproduction of plants comprises "the recombination of genetic
material."35 Therefore, offspring plants are not exactly like the
parent plants or like each other." Sexual reproduction in plants
may involve one or two plants and is carried out by seed produc-
tion.
Asexual reproduction is the reproduction of plants without the
sexual process and can occur in many forms such as bulbs, shoots,
and even by human intervention such as by cuttings or by graft-
ing.38 New plants that are created asexually have the same ge-
netic material as the parent plant and are essentially a clone.39
Genetic uniformity can be desirable when the plant breeder wants
to replicate a specific trait that a particular plant possesses, such
as a particular flower color or a seedless fruit or even a plant that
appears to be resilient to certain harms, such as weather or dis-
eases." Cloned plants are very common in commercial settings.4
Some plants, such as those that bear seedless fruits, have to be
reproduced asexually through human intervention 2 because there
is no other way to reproduce plants that provide seedless fruits
other than by human intervention. For instance, if a breeder hap-
34. The California Backyard Orchard: The Big Picture - Propagation, available at
http://homeorchard.ucdavis.edu/general-prop.shtml (last visited June 21, 2003). The repro-
duction of plants will only be considered briefly and in general terms in order to provide a
basic understanding of plant reproduction so that the laws protecting plants can be under-
stood more fully. For a more in depth look at plant anatomy and reproduction, see
ANTHONY HUXLEY, THE NEW ROYAL HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY DICTIONARY OF GARDENING
3, at 603-25, 642-44 (1999 ed.).
35. The California Backyard Orchard: The Big Picture - Propagation, supra note 34.
36. Native Plants Network - General Propagation Techniques, available at
http://nativeplants.for.uidaho.edu/network/general.asp (last visited October 31, 2003).
37. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 132 n.3.
38. Stems and Roots: Structure and Functions, available at http://www.hcs.ohio-
state.edu/hcs200/stems.html (last visited June 21, 2003).
39. Janet Marinelli, Cloning - Long Before Dolly the Sheep, There was "Bartlett" the
Pear, 12 PLANTS AND GARDENS NEWS 3 (Fall 1997), available at
http://www.bbg.org/gar2/topics/sustainable/1997fa-Cloning.html (last visited June 21,
2003).





pens to find or create a plant with desirable characteristics, such
as a particular seedless orange, the only way to make more of that
particular seedless orange is to asexually reproduce that particu-
lar plant.
D. Types of protection available for plants
There are three types of protection available to plant breeders.
Utility Patent Protection and the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA) are available for sexually reproduced plants.43 The Plant
Patent Act protects asexually reproduced plants."
The Plant Variety Protection Act45 (PVPA), enacted in 1970,
provides patent-like protection to breeders who have sexually re-
produced plants.4" The PVPA is administered by the Office of
Plant Variety Protection, which is located within the Department
of Agriculture.47 Grants of protection under the PVPA are certifi-
cates of plant variety, and are for any new variety of sexually re-
producible plant, which has been sexually reproduced by the
breeder. s Certificates may be issued upon a showing that the va-
riety is "new, distinct, uniform, and stable."' The protection allo-
cated to breeders under the PVPA contains two exemptions: one
for research and one for farmers to save and replant seed on their
own farms."0
In order to acquire a greater degree of protection, plant breeders
may obtain a utility patent for their sexually reproduced plants.5'
They must comply with the written description requirement under
section 112 and, in order to satisfy the enablement requirement,
place a deposit of seed that is accessible to the public.52 However,
some plant breeders are unable to comply with the requirements
listed under section 112, especially for plants that can only be re-
43. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 131, 138.
44. Id. at 132.
45. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-82 (2003).
46. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 138.
47. See 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2003).
48. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 138. Certificates of plant variety issued under the
PVPA are different from, and are not considered, patents. Id.
49. Id. at 142. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2003).
50. JE.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 129 n.1. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544 (2003).
51. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 145-46. Utility Patents for plants do not contain
exemptions for saving seeds and provide more protection than the PVPA. Id. at 129 n.1.
52. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 131. The placement of seed in a publicly accessible
area satisfies the enablement requirement so that after the utility patent expires, the pub-
lic has access to the plant and has the ability to reproduce the plant. Ex Parte C, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1495 (B.P.A.I 1992). See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801 - 1.809 (2003).
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produced asexually. The alternative available to them is the Plant
Patent Act, which is described in more detail below. 3 Plants pro-
tected under the plant patent laws do not need to meet the re-
quirements prescribed by section 112, whereas plants protected by
a utility patent do need to meet the requirements.54
E. Plant Patent Act
Congress extended the scope of the patent laws to include
asexually reproduced plants in 1930 by enacting the Plant Patent
Act.55 The purpose of the Plant Patent Act was:
[T]o afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same oppor-
tunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as
has been given [to] industry, and thus assist in placing agri-
culture on a basis of economic equality with industry [and
thereby] removing the existing discrimination between plant
developers and industrial inventors."
There was concern displayed within the legislative history that
plant breeders had no financial incentive to breed plants since
once a new variety of plant would be sold by the breeder, the pub-
lic was free to asexually reproduce the plant. Congress recog-
nized the need for a stable food supply and the public benefit, in
general, that plants provide.58 The only funding available then for
53. J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 131-32.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2003). No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance
with section 112 of this title if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible. Id.
55. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 981 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The Plant Patent Act is codified in
35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64. The Act only protects the asexual reproduction of plants because that
is the only way that the plant's identity is preserved. See S. REP. No. 315, at 3-5 (1930) and
H.R. REP.No. 1129, at 4-7, (1930). See also, infra part IIC. For more information about the
history and background of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 see Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent
act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Creation, J.PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y, Sep-
tember 2000, at 621.
56. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 982.
57. S. REP. NO. 315 at 1.
58. Id. at 2.
The food and timber supply of the Nation for the future is dependant upon the intro-
duction of new varieties. Many millions of Federal and private funds are annually
spent in combating disease through plant quarantines, disinfection, spraying, and
other methods. The phoney peach disease has threatened the important peach supply
of Georgia and the welfare of one of the most important industries of that State. The
chestnut blight has wiped the eastern forests clean of the valuable chestnut tree ...
The plant pathologist has through his experiments attempted but with slight success
to combat these plant diseases. But an equally valuable means of combating plant
disease is the development of new disease resistant varieties by the plant breeder.
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plant breeding was through government grants and private dona-
tions. 9 Congress hoped that through the enactment of the Plant
Patent Act, more private funding would develop."°
Congress clearly anticipated that plant patents would be treated
in the same way as utility patents are treated.' The laws relating
to plant patents are the same as the laws that relate to utility
patents, with the exception of the inability to comply with section
112.62 In fact, the original time period in which Congress gave an
"originator control of his discovery [was] a period of 17 years, the
same term as under industrial patents."63 Since that time, the re-
spective patent terms have been changed to 20 years from the date
of the filing of the patent application in the United States Patent
Office.6
F. Patent Misuse
The "[p]atent misuse doctrine is concerned with two basic sorts
of perceived evils: the use of patents to undermine competition
and the expansion of patent rights beyond their lawful scope.'5
The principle of patent misuse requires a showing of the fact that
the patent was broadened in some fashion and that this broaden-
ing affects competition.6 "The concept of patent misuse arose to
restrain practices that did not in and of themselves violate any
law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the patent
right[s], and thus were deemed to be contrary to public policy." 7
The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the patentee from obtain-
ing a market benefit beyond what is given by statute.8 Patent
misuse, however, is only an equitable defense, and it is not an ac-
tionable claim.69
The bill proposes to give the breeder the incentive to develop such varieties without
the aid of Federal funds.
S. REP. No. 315 at 2.
59. Id. at 1-3.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1-3, 6-9.
62. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-62 (2003).
63. S. REP. No. 315 at 2; See also note 2 supra and accompanying text.
64. 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2).
65. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2b at 3-7 (2002 ed).
66. Id.
67. Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed.Cir. 1992).
68. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704.
69. Foseco, Inc. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 1633 (E.D. Mo.
1988).
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There are three types of misuse examinations." First, there are
a few practices which may fall within the scope of per se patent
misuse which include "tying arrangements in which a patentee
conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a separa-
ble, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee effectively
extends the term of its patent by requiring post-expiration royal-
ties."' The court held in Mallincrodt v. Medipart72 "that price fix-
ing was misuse per se."" When conduct has been proven as being
per se patent misuse, no further analysis is required. 4
Second, at the other extreme, there are a number of activities
that have been determined to not be misuse by way of the 1988
amendments to the Patent Act." For example, the 1988 amend-
ment altered the holding of Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,76
which was that all tying arrangements are misuse per se,77 to
where only tying arrangements that exist where there is evidence
of market power 8 constitute patent misuse. 9 Lastly, the category
70. HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 65, § 3.2b at 3-7.
71. Virginia Panel v. MAC Panel, 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997), see HOVENKAMP,
ETAL., supra note 64, §3.2b at 3-7.
72. 976 F.2d 700 at 704-706.
73. HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 65, § 3.2b at 3-7.
74. Id.
75. The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub.L.No. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988),
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), see HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 65, § 3.2b at 3-7, and
PATRICK J. FLINN, HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS AND REMEDIES, § 6.07B
at 6-89 (2000 ed.). 35 U.S.C. 271(d) states:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory in-
fringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal ex-
tension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized
another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute con-
tributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to
the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or pur-
chase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner
has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which
the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. 271(d).
76. 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942).
77. Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 491.
78. The Ninth Circuit, in Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak, stated that:
Market power can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence .... To demonstrate
market power by circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must: (1) define the relevant
market, (2) show that the defendant owns a dominant share of that market, and (3)
show that there are significant barriers to entry and show that existing competitors
lack the capacity to increase their output in the shortrun.
Image Technical Services, Inc v. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997).
79. HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 65, §3.2b at 3-7; Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869.
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that falls in between these two extremes exists where inquiries
into anticompetitive effects are relevant.0
When a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither
per se patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse
analysis by § 271(d), a court must determine if that practice is
"reasonably within the patent grant i.e., that it relates to sub-
ject matter within the scope of the patent claims."' If so, the
practice does not have the effect of broadening the scope of the
patent claims and thus cannot constitute patent misuse. If, on
the other hand, the practice has the effect of extending the
patentee's statutory rights and does so with an anti-
competitive effect, that practice must then be analyzed in ac-
cordance with the "rule of reason." Under the rule of reason,
"the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned prac-
tice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking
into account a variety of factors, including specific informa-
tion about the relevant business, its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature,
and effect."82
The doctrine of patent misuse may be summed up as an overex-
tension of the patentee's rights, either physically or temporally,
creating an anticompetitive effect on commerce. In establishing
patent misuse, there must be proof that the patentee has market
power and proof that the patentee's conduct is an unreasonable
restraint on competition.83 Patent misuse and antitrust are very
closely related, and some have argued that the patent misuse laws
should be made coextensive with the antitrust laws.84 However,
the fact that they are separate allows patent misuse to serve as an
internal constraint on the patent system, keeping that system
within its bounds, as well as being able to reach areas that are not
covered by antitrust law.85
80. HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 65, §3.2b at 3-7.
81. Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (citing Mallinckrodt 976 F.2d at 708).
82. Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997));
See also HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 64, §3.2b at 3-7 to 3-8.
83. HOVENKAMP, ETAL., supra note 65, §3.3a at 3-10 to 3-11.
84. Id. § 3.2c at 3-9; USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982).




Monopoly has been defined as "the power to control prices or ex-
clude competition."6 In United States v. Grinnell Corp., " the Su-
preme Court defined unlawful monopolization as having two ele-
ments under Section Two of the Sherman Act.88 The first element
is "the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market.8 9
The second element is "the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
sequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent."90
With respect to the first element and determining the existence
of "monopoly power," it is necessary to define the relevant market
and then to assess the defendant's power within the defined mar-
ket.91 Courts examine circumstantial and direct evidence of the
monopoly power and may consider a number of factors. 92 However,
the leading indicator of monopoly power is market share. 93
The second element has been defined as the willful acquisition
or exercise of monopoly power, and as a result not all monopolies
are unlawful.94 A lot of controversy has been created due to the
disagreement on what conduct will satisfy the requirement of will-
fulness.95 Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not meant to prevent
mere market dominance and punish a successful competitor.96 "It
is the acquisition, maintenance, or exercise of monopoly power -
not its mere existence - that violates Section 2."" A business may
86. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
87. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
88. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985) (quot-
ing Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71); See also 2 JULIAN OVON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST
LAws AND TRADE REGULATION, ch. 25 (2d ed. 2003). If a private plaintiff brings a cause of
action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act seeking damages he or she "must demonstrate
'antitrust injury' caused by the conduct that offends Section 2." 2 JULIAN O.VON
KALINOWSKI ET AL., at § 25.02, p. 25-8.
89. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 596.
90. Id.
91. 2 JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, at § 25.02, p. 25-9.
92. Id., § 25.03[3], at 25-29.
93. Id., § 25.02, at 25-9. "Ever since the Alcoa case was decided in 1945, the market
share enjoyed by the alleged monopolist has been the most important indicator of monopoly
power." Id. § 25.03[3] at 25-30. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
94. 2 JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, at § 25.02, p. 25-9.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 25-10 to 25-12.
Mere size, nor continued exercise of lawful powers by even a monopolist, is not illegal
when that size and power have been obtained by lawful means and developed by
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have lawfully achieved its power because of a new discovery,98 its
"superior skill, its business acumen, its superior products, or its
economic or technological efficiency, or merely by the fortuitous
course of events."99 Laws and circumstances may convey lawful
monopolies.00 For example, patents and copyrights convey a pe-
riod of exclusivity; also, there are laws involving public utilities.0 '
One of the most popular types of monopolization cases is when a
monopolist refuses to deal with another company.0 2 Many courts
have assessed such behavior according to the analysis in United
States v. Colgate.!0 3 The Supreme Court stated in Colgate that:
"[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the [Sherman] Act does not restrict the long-recognized right of a
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal."0 4
natural growth. "It would be paradoxical for government .. to encourage a race for
the swift and then reward the victor with a sentence of economic death." Under the
economic conditions extant in the United States today, bigness is not per se illegal--it
is here to stay ... Monopolies coming about through non-predatory, nonexclusionary
and essentially fair competitive practices are not ipso facto condemned, i.e., through
aggressive merchandising, and employing vigorous but nevertheless honest economic
maneuvers to enlarge its market position. What is condemned [is] growth by business
methods designed for and having the effect of impeding new entry into the market, or
excluding those whose occupancy is already precarious, by recognizably exclusionary
devices. Competing fairly and aggressively, regardless of the consequences to one's
rivals is not condemned. Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705,
717-18 (D. Haw. 1964), affd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1086, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969).
2 JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, § 25.02 n.9, at 25-12.
The legislative history of Section 2 reveals that Congress did not intend to ban all
monopolies. For example, Section 2 was not intended to apply to one who happens by
his skill and energy to command an innocent and legitimate monopoly of business. 21
Cong. Rec. 3151 (1890). See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 390, 76 S. Ct. 994, 100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956) (Senator Hoar, in discussing § 2,
pointed out that monopoly involved something more than extraordinary commercial
success, "that it involved something like the use of means which made it impossible
for other persons to engage in fair competition. This exception to the Sherman Act
prohibitions of monopoly power is perhaps the monopoly 'thrust upon' one of [Al-
coa].")
2 JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, § 25.02 n.9, at 25-13.
98. Am. Tobacco Co v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946).
99. 2 JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, § 25.02, at 25-13.
100. Id. § 25.02, at 25-14.
101, Id.
102. Id. § 25.04[3][a], at 25-69.
103. 250 U.S. 300 (1919), see 2 JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL. supra note 88, §
25.04[3][a], at 25-69.
104. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
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There are two theories under which refusals to deal have been
analyzed. These theories are the intent test and the "essential
facilities" doctrine.1 5 The intent test focuses on the defendant's
"intent to create or maintain a monopoly."' 6 The "essential facili-
ties" doctrine, as developed by the lower courts, has the following
four elements that the plaintiff must prove: "(1) control of an es-
sential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability rea-
sonably or practically to duplicate the essential facility; (3) denial
of the use of the facility to the competitor; and (4) providing the
competitor access to the facility is feasible."1 °7
In the first element (control of an essential facility), the term
"facility" has been found to apply to tangible assets, and some
courts also conclude it encompasses intangible assets.' 8 In order to
be essential, the facility must be controlled by a monopolist, and
the access to the facility must be necessary to the plaintiffs ability
to compete.00 If equivalent facilities exist, a facility will not be
considered "essential." 0
The second element does not require the plaintiff prove that the
facilities are impossible to copy; it must only be proven that it
would be unreasonable or uneconomical to copy the facility."' Ad-
ditionally, the plaintiff must show that he is a competitor of the
defendant.'
The third element requires denial of access to the essential fa-
cilities to a competitor. Absolute denial is not required if the plain-
tiff can prove that the access provided was on an unreasonable
basis." 3 The fourth element requires that the plaintiff-competitor
show that it is feasible, and within reason, ' for the defendant to
provide access."'
105. 2 JULIAN OVON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, § 25.04[3][a], at 25-69 to 25-70.
106. Id. § 25.04[31[a], at 25-70.
107. Id. § 25.04[3][b], at 25-81. These elements were described in MCI Communications
v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) and have been cited by many courts. 2
JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, § 25.04[3][b], at 25-81 n.114.
108. Id. § 25.04[3][b], at 25-89.
109. Id. § 25.04[3][b], at 25-89, 25-90.
110. 2 JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, at § 25.04[31[b], at 25-93.
111. Fishman v. Estate of Wertz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-540 (7th Cir, 1986); See also Hecht
v. ProFootball, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (U.S.App.D.C. 1977) and 2 JULIAN O.VON
KALINOWSKI ET AL. supra note 88, § 25.04[3][b], at 25-95 to 25-98.
112. Thomas Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 509 (D.C.Cir. 1999); See also 2
JULIAN O.VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 88, § 25.04[3][b], at 25-97.
113. Id. § 25.04[3][b], at 25-99.
114. "No court has decided that a monopolist must increase capacity or build new facili-
ties in order to grant access." Id. § 25.04[3][b], at 25-101.
115. Id. § 25.04[3][b], at 25-100.
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H. Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
provides that a person can not be deprived of his or her property
without due process of the law, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."116 Both tangible
and intangible property may be protected under the Fifth
Amendment." 7  Berman v. Parker"' is the leading modern case
with respect to defining the scope of the public use limitation." 9
The Berman opinion confirmed "that the public use limitation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment is as expansive as a due
process police power test."'2 °
In Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,"' the Court found that the
Land Reform Act of 1967, passed by the Hawaiian legislature as
an exercise of eminent domain, "was rationally related to the pub-
lic purpose of correcting deficiencies in the real estate market and
social problems attributed to land oligopoly."'22 A large portion of
the land in Hawaii was owned by just a few people, which inter-
fered with the state's residential land market and forced thou-
sands of individuals to lease the land that lie beneath their homes,
rather than to purchase it.' 2' The land oligopoly had perpetuated
from the time when the monarchs ruled the island.'24 One of the
main issues was whether there was a legitimate public use since
the land would be taken from a few private individuals in order to
be given to other private individuals.'25 The Hawaii Hous. Auth.
Court turned to the Berman decision to evaluate the Land Reform
Act's constitutionality. Berman, in the context of determining
whether the takings were for public use, had stated that require-
ments of a state's ability to use its police powers in eminent do-
main, which "attempt[s] to define its reach or trace its outer limits
116. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
117. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 472-73, n.4 (6th ed.
2000).
118. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
119. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 497.
120. Id. The Berman case was concerned with the constitutionality of the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. Private Property was being taken under the power
of eminent domain for the sole purpose of redeveloping the area so as to prevent slum and
substandard housing. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
121. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
122. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 498.
123. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 242.
124. Id. at 241-42.
125. Id. at 233-34.
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are fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts."126 The
Berman Court went on to say:
The definition [of the outer limits of police power] is essen-
tially the product of legislative determinations addressed to
the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor
historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken,
the public interest had been declared in terms well-nigh con-
clusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the
main guardian of the public needs served by social legislation.
... Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means
to an end .... Once the object is within the authority of Con-
gress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Con-
gress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of
private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants
argue that this makes the project a taking from one busi-
nessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the
means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress
alone to determine, once the public purpose has been estab-
lished.127
The role for the courts to play in evaluating the legislature's
judgment of what constitutes a "public use" is an "extremely nar-
row one."28 The courts are not to substitute their own judgment in
place of the legislature's "unless the use be palpably without rea-
sonable foundation."'29 The Hawaii Hous. Auth. Court stated that,
"Irlegulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic
exercise of a State's police powers . . . [w]e cannot disapprove of
Hawaii's exercise of this power."3 '
III. ANALYSIS
Many issues surround the loophole that developed in the Plant
Patent legislation. The patent laws were established to ultimately
126. Id. at 239 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
127. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 239-40 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33).
128. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
129. Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. at 241 (citing United States v. Gettysburg
Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
130. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 242.
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benefit the public by giving the patentee a time of exclusivity to
recoup costs and make a profit. 3 ' This period of exclusivity is in
exchange for full disclosure of the best mode of the invention, so
that when the patent term expires, the public may freely duplicate
the invention. 132 The 1930 Plant Patent Act was created with the
same purpose in order to give agriculture the same benefits as
industry.'33 In the legislative history, the House of Representatives
Report analogizes the breeder to the inventor and the plant to the
invention in order to show that there is Constitutional support
enabling Congress to have the power to create the plant patent
legislation.3 1 In fact, plant patents are to follow the same rules as
regular patents, with the exception of the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112, which requires the inventor to provide a written de-
scription so that an individual skilled in the art could duplicate
the invention.' Plant patents are exempted from this require-
ment because an individual could not "recreate" the patented
plant even if the same two parent plants were used, due to the
way the genetic information is distributed each time a plant is
sexually reproduced.'36
The legislature did not concern themselves with a mode of en-
ablement, nor did they need to. From the legislative history, one
can surmise that the legislature was concerned about protecting
nursery owners and breeders who sold to the public and to other
farmers when it enacted the Plant Patent Act.'37 Perhaps Congress
131. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255-258.
132. AK Steel, 2003 U.S.App.LEXIS 19640, at 24-27.
133. S. REP. No. 71-315 at 1 (1930).
134. H.R. REP. No. 71-1129 at 7-9 (1930).
135. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-62.
136. See Ex Parte C for a discussion about plant reproduction and the inability to repro-
duce the same exact plant even if a full disclosure were given. Ex Parte C deals with being
able to grant utility patents for plants, which gives greater protection for plants than do
plant patents, which only protect the plant from being asexually reproduced. Ex Parte C, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (1992). (See also J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. 124, which discusses the
differences between the protections available to plants by the Plant Patent Act, the Plant
Variety Protection Act and those protected by Utility Patents).
137. The test of the pertinent legislative history reads:
To-day the plant breeder has no adequate financial incentive to enter upon his work.
A new variety once it has left the hands of the breeder may be reproduced in unlim-
ited quantity by all. The originator's only hope of financial reimbursement is through
high prices for the comparatively few reproductions that he may dispose of during the
first two or three years. After that time, depending upon the speed with which the
plant may be asexually reproduced, the breeder loses all control of his discovery. Un-
der the bill the originator will have control of his discovery during a period of 17
years, the same term as industrial patents.
S. REP. No. 71-315 at 1-2.
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assumed that the breeder would continue to sell the plants to the
public for the life of the patent term, and upon expiration, indi-
viduals would be free to reproduce the plants that they had al-
ready purchased. Therefore, the rationale follows that the need for
enablement is not required because the plant is already out in the
public domain and thus free to be asexually reproduced once the
plant patent term has expired. However, the legislature did not
account for the case where a breeder would create a plant, patent
it, and then not sell the plant to the public, other breeders, or
farmers. Such a situation can exist when a breeder develops seed-
less fruit, patents the plant, sells fruit for years that is borne from
the plant, but does not sell any plants. The plant, itself, never
reaches the public, and as a result, the farmer still maintains total
control over the plants beyond the patent term. The breeder
would believe that they are his plants. After all, he grew them
and may maintain a personal property right in them, or can he?
The farmer's arguments may include the following: I followed
the patent laws, I was granted a patent, it expired, so what? Other
patents don't require the patentee to open up his shop or research
lab or chemical plant and allow people to come take the patentee's
products of invention, so why should I allow people on my farm to
take cuttings of my plants? Each argument has a valid point. This
particular type of case had fallen through the cracks and was left
unaccounted for under the Plant Patent Act.
In Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats,'38 the Supreme Court
declared federal policy to be that "all ideas in general circulation
be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
valid patent."'39 In Bonito Boats, the Court struck down a Florida
state law that allowed for protection of boat hull designs, which
was similar to the protection given by the federal patent schemes.
The Court stated that the "petitioner chose to expose its hull de-
sign to the public in the marketplace, eschewing the bargain held
out by the federal patent system of disclosure in exchange for ex-
clusive use. Yet, the Florida Statute allows petitioner to reassert a
substantial property right in the idea, thereby constricting the
spectrum of useful public knowledge ... .""' The policy of informa-
tion becoming available that was not being currently protected by
138. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
139. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 159-60 (citing Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969)).
140. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 159.
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patent law was also discussed in U.S. v. Dubillier Condenser
Corp.,14' where the Court stated:
[An inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its
fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the
consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted.
An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen
years, but, upon the expiration of that period, the knowl-
edge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus en-
143abled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.
Another state law concept that was used to expand the length of
a patent was invalidated in Scott Paper v. Marcalus Mfg.' 4 In
Scott Paper, the Court held that ideas stemming from an expired
patent are free for the public to use and "whatever the legal device
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent
laws.' 45
One can argue that if the breeder did not want to share his dis-
covery (his plants) with the public that he should not have pat-
ented the plant and should have just used the personal property or
trade secret rights provided to him by state law to protect his in-
vestment. Not patenting the plants may have prevented them
from entering the public domain, and the breeder could indefi-
nitely reap the benefits, while he was able to maintain control
over the plants. This practice runs counter to the patent laws, but
the issue of how it can be corrected remains. The issue posed is
whether the breeder has established an illegal monopoly.
Illegal monopolies have two elements: a possession of monopoly
power in a relevant market and the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power. 1 6 The Supreme Court in U.S. v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours evaluated whether du Pont was illegally monopolizing
the cellophane market. 47 The Court stated that determining the
market "for commodities depends on how different from one an-
other are the offered commodities in character or use [and] how
141. 289 U.S. 178(1933).
142. Utility Patent terms are now 20 years from the date of filing of the application. 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1952); see generally note 25, supra.
143. Dubilier Condenser, 289 U.S. at 186-87.
144. 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
145. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255-56.
146. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 595-96.
147. U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 378 (1956).
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far buyers will go to substitute one commodity for another.""8 The
Court did not limit the market definition of cellophane to just cel-
lophane - it expanded the definition to include all flexible-
wrapping devices.4 9 In the case where a breeder is selling fruit
borne from a plant that was once protected by a now expired pat-
ent (that no one else in the public domain has), there are many
ways that an individual could define the market. For instance,
using grapes, the markets could be: fruit, grapes, red grapes,
green grapes, seedless grapes, green seedless grapes, red seedless
grapes, etc. The broadest market may be classified as grapes. Al-
though there are many kinds of grapes, and some may have more
desirable characteristics than others, they are all classified as
grapes.
A breeder, if he were in the grape market, could not be readily
accused of being a monopolist because there are so many other
types of grapes on the market. Therefore, trying to quickly remedy
the loophole in the Plant Patent Act by using the claim of illegal
monopolization power is not the key.
Another way to close this loophole is to view this as patent mis-
use, based on the claim that a patentee has expanded the scope of
the patent temporally. When the patent expires, the idea, the in-
vention, and the plant become a part of the public domain. Since
patent misuse is merely an equitable defense and not an action-
able claim, 5' the only way to correct the lack of reasonable access
to such a plant by the public is through an amendment to the
Plant Patent Act for prospective and retroactive plant patents.
The amendment would have to require the patent holder to pro-
vide plants to the public once the patent expires by perhaps selling
a plant, for a reasonable amount, to those who would want one, or
alternatively by providing a plant or two to a government run
greenhouse or depository that would be responsible for propagat-
ing and selling the plants.
The argument against such an amendment's application to older
plant patent holders is that such an amendment could be con-
strued as a taking which would be violative of the Fifth Amend-
148. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 393.
149. Id. at 393-94. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours, the Court considered various flexible
packaging or wrapping devices including "aluminum, cellulose acetate, chlorides, wood
pulp, rubber hydrochloride, and ethylene gas." Id. at 396-97. This demonstrates that the
Court is willing to define the market broadly in order to include substitutes.
150. Foseco, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1633 (1988). See also 6 DONALD CHISUM, supra note
2, § 19.04[4] for an in depth discussion of patent misuse.
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ment's Taking Clause.5 ' The breeders, who had no intention of
selling their plants to the public and were content to sell the fruit
borne from the once patented plants, could argue that forcing
them to sell plants that they would rather keep could be consid-
ered a "taking." The Takings Clause requires that a successful
government taking must be for public use and for just compensa-
tion.'52 The question then arises of whether selling plants to a pri-
vate individual is considered to be an adequate public use. The
Supreme Court decided this issue in Hawaii Hous. Auth.'53 Legis-
lation that enabled the lessor to purchase the land from lessees,
essentially from one private individual to another private individ-
ual, was upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional, because
the role that the courts play in evaluating the legislature's judg-
ment of what constitutes a public use is an extremely narrow
one." The role of regulating the evils of oligopolies is a "classic
exercise of a State's police powers."'55 The Supreme Court upheld
the questioned legislation regarding the taking of land, therefore,
it is highly unlikely that an invention would be afforded more pro-
tection under the Constitution. The purpose of patent law is to
protect ideas for a limited time and then they are ultimately to be
dedicated to the public; the same cannot be said in the case of real
property.
Regulating Patents is one of the powers enumerated in the Con-
stitution that Congress is able to regulate. Therefore, Congress
can amend the patent laws accordingly in order to prevent further
misuse by select plant patentees. Fixing this problem appears to
be out of the realm of the judicial branch's power.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to close the existing loophole in plant patent law, cur-
rently depriving the public of the invention or plant for which a
patent was granted in order to protect it for the lifetime of the
patent, Congress should amend the plant patent laws to account
for the fact that it is possible for a plant patentee to monopolize a
new plant for a period that extends beyond the temporal scope of
the patent. This is also known as patent misuse. However, patent
151. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 472-73, n. 4.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
153. See text accompanying notes 119-128, supra.
154. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
155. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 242.
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misuse is an inadequate remedy since it is only to be used as a
defense for an infringing party. When a patentee applies for a
patent there is an understanding that the invention, or in this
case, the plant, will enter the public domain upon the expiration of
the patent. This is the policy behind the patent laws. If breeders
intend to not ever share their plants, they should protect them
using another approach.
Colleen R. Butcher
